Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 44 | Number 4

Article 13

1-1-2004

Book Review [Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of
Creativity]
Santa Clara Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Santa Clara Law Review, Book Review, Book Review [Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of
Creativity], 44 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1287 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss4/13

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

BOOK REVIEW

OF
EXPRESSION:
WORK
THIS
PROTECT
CLARIFYING THE UNIQUE ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the

Corporate Confiscation of Creativityby Michael Perelman.
New York City: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2002.
Hard Cover. $31.95.

Pp. 272.

Reviewed byLee Bollinger*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over the proper scope of the intellectual property laws-particularly copyright and patent law-has become more vigorous and relevant every day.' This is due in
part to the rise of the "New Economy," one increasingly dependent upon and driven by the value of information, ideas,
and technology rather than tangible goods, manufacturing
and manual labor.2 Opinions vary strongly over how the in* Instructor of Law and Executive Director of the Intellectual Property
Law Program at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank
Harry First for his extremely helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this review. I would also like to thank James Erickson for his superb
editorial assistance. Lastly, I wish to thank Kelly Baxter, Melissa Tronquet,
and the editors of the Santa Clara School Law Review for their excellent work.

1. See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE
RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001);

see also Robert Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004,
§ 6,at 40.
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001) (referring to the "New Economy" as embodying three
distinct industries: computer software, Internet-based businesses, and communications services and equipment); see also Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2001) (stating that the "essential feature that is new
about the 'New Economy' is its increased dependence on products and services
that are the embodiments of ideas").
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tellectual property (or IP) laws should best evolve to promote
innovation in this new environment, and the extent to which
these laws may reasonably take credit for the economic progress associated with the New Economy.3
Intellectual property law has become increasingly controversial due in part to its more widespread impact on the everyday lives of millions of people who now enjoy, and increasingly rely on, the technological developments associated with
the New Economy. Advances in technologies related to the
digitalization of information and media, the Internet, and the
entertainment and the telecommunications industries in particular, have fundamentally changed certain aspects of the
American culture and basic norms of human interaction. The
technological developments in the entertainment industry,
particularly those involving music and film, have been accompanied by equally notable progress in producing tools that
allow consumers, rather than producers, to control the access
to and ownership of copyrighted content.4 The affected industries and the IP laws have struggled to keep up, with varying
success.5 However, some of the responses of lawmakers and
producers to reassert control over protected content have created a cultural backlash against the scope and even the basic
necessity of the intellectual property laws.6
3. See, e.g., COPYFIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) [hereinafter
COPYFIGHTS] (presenting various authors debating over, inter alia, how intellectual property law should be revised to meet the unique conditions of the "digital" or "information" age and the proper scope and subject matter of patent law).
4. See, e.g., Harry First, Online Music Joint Ventures: Taken for a Song

(forthcoming 2004) (describing how technological progress involving the Internet, broadband technology, computer software, and the digitalization of music
have fundamentally altered the ways in which consumers may now listen to
and/or own prerecorded music).
5. Id. Professor First points out that the rise of illegal file-sharing software that allowed consumers to make free copies of music in violation of copyright law has given rise to a quickly evolving online music industry that has
greatly increased the ways in which consumers may consume and/or own prerecorded music (by, for example, unbundling individual songs from albums, the
use of online subscription services that permit consumers to listen to music
"streams" for a fee, and the emergence of legal counterparts to the original Napster website that permit the downloading and/or burning of individual music
files for a fee). See generallyid
6. See generallyBoynton, supra note 1. Boynton describes the backlash as
a response to several recent events, including the copyright infringement law-

suits filed recently by the Recording Industry Association of America against
thousands of individuals over their use of file-sharing software to acquire and

2004

BOOKREVIEW

1289

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO PERELMAN'S CRITIQUE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS

A rather extreme outgrowth of this movement is represented by the views expressed by Michael Perelman, an
economist, in Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property Rights
and the Corporate ConFiscation of Creativity.' Perelman provides a scathing critique of the IP laws, ultimately advocating
their total abolition and replacement by a regime based on a
"public goods" model in which innovation would be publicly
funded through taxes and accessed or "owned" by all.' It is
difficult to find any aspect of the IP laws that the author is
willing to praise. Perelman's views are well summarized in
the title of his introduction, "How Intellectual Property
Rights Enrich the Few While Undermining Liberty, Science,
and Society."9
Perelman's basic claim is that the intellectual property
laws have actually done more harm than good in promoting
their expressed goals of fostering innovation and technological progress.' ° Further, he believes that the technologydriven economic prosperity enjoyed by the U.S. over the past
three decades occurred in spite of the intellectual property
laws, rather than because of them." According to Perelman,
the most recent technological and scientific discoveries have
been based upon a preexisting public domain of knowledge
and information. 2 Further, Perelman claims that this rich
body of public domain knowledge was largely created by government-financed research rather than previously proprietary intellectual property whose protection had merely
lapsed." Perelman believes that scientific progress was much
more efficient when researchers-unconcerned with the

share digital copies of music files; the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act,
which added twenty years of protection to copyrighted works, arguably to protect corporate profits at the expense of the public domain; and the unintended
overbreadth of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Id.; see also Drew Clark,
How CopyiqghtBecame Controversial,in COPYFIGHTS, supra note 3, at 147.
7. MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE CORPORATE CONFISCATION OF CREATMTY (2002).
8. See id. at 165. See also infra Part VIII.
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id. at 29.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id.
13. PERELMAN, supranote 7, at 11.
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profit-making potential of the IP rights they could secureworked in a more collaborative and open environment, routinely sharing their thoughts and discoveries. 14 On a much
broader level, Perelman argues that IP rights have exacerbated inequalities of wealth both within and between different countries."
Why have the intellectual property laws failed so miserably in Perelman's view? In short, because the laws function
within a market-based system that is fundamentally at odds
with the "public goods" nature of intellectual property
works.16 To fully understand Perelman's critique (and its
flaws), it is necessary to describe the unique characteristics of
"public goods" and the challenges they pose to traditional economic models of production and consumption.
III. "PUBLIC GOODS" AND THE MARKET

In the language of economics, private property is distinguished from "public goods" in two fundamental ways.17 First,
whereas restricting access to private property is typically
relatively easy (by, for example, building a fence, attaching a
lock, or merely retaining physical possession of the property),
regulating access to "public goods" is much more difficult.
The economic exploitation of certain property largely depends
on the ability of the owner to regulate (and "tax") its use by
others. The value of "public goods" property is therefore often
substantially reduced due to the owner's inability to either
exclude or charge free-riders who reap the benefits of access
without bearing any costs.
Secondly, the possession and consumption of private
property is considered to be "rival," meaning that possession
necessarily deprives others the opportunity to simultaneously
possess the property. By contrast, the possession and consumption of "public goods" is deemed "non-rival" because one
person's possession or consumption of the property does not
typically affect the ability of others to simultaneously possess

14. Seeid at 48, 103.
15. See id. at 6, 26.
16. Id. at 7.
17. See, e.g., Michael Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 767 (2002); see also Shubha Ghosh, Tlls, Patents,and
Power: State Creation of GrayMarkets as a Limit on PatentRights, 53 FLA. L.
REV. 789, 796-99 (2001).
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or derive utility from the property. 8 For example, the disclosure by an inventor of the details of a patentable invention to
others does not reduce the utility that the innovator may personally derive from his invention. However, in the absence of
either a practical or legal limit to the theoretically inexhaustible supply of the idea, the market value of the right to
"own" the idea or access an additional copy of the idea is very
low.
Therefore, as a general matter, left to an open market
without government regulation or special legal protection, investments in "public goods" are uniquely risky and unappealing. In the face of a product whose accessibility is not easily
regulated and whose supply is largely unaffected by consumption, producers have few incentives to invest in products with
"public goods" characteristics.
The subject matter of intellectual property law - innovation and intellectual creations - is correctly recognized as a
species of "public goods" due to the difficulty owners face of
regulating access (and charging for use) and the "non-rival"
nature of its possession and consumption. While products of
innovation are typically embodied in physical (or "rival")
form, the unusually low marginal cost 9 of producing additional copies effectively re-establishes their "non-rival" nature. Indeed, one of the predominant justifications of the intellectual property laws is to avoid the "market failure" (or
the unacceptably low level of production as a matter of public
policy) that would otherwise occur due to the insufficient incentives to create goods that have little profit-making potential to their creators but which have potentially high social
and economic value to society.
Perelman turns this core justification on its head, using
the "public goods" characteristics of IP as a starting point in
building arguments that purport to demonstrate that the IP
laws have "failed" because of their fundamental incompatibility with free markets. However, Perelman arrives at this
flawed conclusion only by (1) falsely assuming that innovation
is naturally abundant in society and would remain abundant
in the absence of the incentives provided by IP law, (2) ignor18. See Ghosh, supra note 17, at 797-98.
19. "Marginal cost" is the cost to a firm of producing one additional unit of a
given good. See, e.g., HERBERT HOvEMKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.1b, at 9 (1994).
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ing the unusually high pre-inventive fixed costs that must be
recovered by an innovator to justify his efforts (and encourage
future investment), focusing instead on the unusually low
marginal cost of reproducing IP works, which Perelman argues justifies the treatment of innovation as a "public good"
that should be "given away" and owned by all,2" and (3) adopting a flawed view of both the economic power conferred by IP
rights and of the relationship between intellectual property
and competition policy. Each problem is discussed in sequence below.
IV. PERELMAN'S MISLEADING NOTION OF "LACK OF SCARCITY"

According to Perelman, conventional economic theory dictates that "goods with zero marginal costs should be treated
as public goods, meaning they should be given away without
cost rather than be sold as commodities."2' This conclusion
stems from an otherwise uncontroversial economic truism: it
is economically inefficient to charge consumers for something
that is costless to access or reproduce.
Perelman shifts his focus to intellectual property as a
type of "public good," arguing that "[i]nformation2 2 is the ultimate non-rivalrous public good."2" Indeed, he claims that information is a "metapublic good," meaning that it is not
merely costless to reproduce or access but "goes beyond 24this
neutral cost, because it actually enriches the community."
Perelman underscores the incompatibility of markets
with "information" by pointing out that the primary function
and value of markets is to efficiently price and distribute
scarce resources. There is no purpose in trading and exchanging "information" in markets because it is not a scarce
resource. 25 Perelman writes, "[t]he concept of scarcity is absolutely irrelevant to information. The more the law restricts
people's access to information, the less information will be
available."2 6

20. PERELMAN, supranote 7, at 165.
21. Id. at 165.

22.
works
23.
24.
25.

"Information" is the term Perelman uses to refer to intellectual property
generally. See id. at 176.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 177.

26. PERELMAN, supranote 7, at 178.
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Therefore, in Perelman's view, by restricting the public's
access to creative works, the intellectual property laws impose artificial conditions of scarcity that "serve no social purpose whatsoever. In fact, using the market to exclude people
from access to information is self-defeating. It does not increase the supply of information. It only spreads ignorance."27
Of course, as a general matter of social policy, it is hard
to quibble with Perelman's claim that we should avoid enacting laws that "spread ignorance" and restrict the flow of information. However, when Perelman substitutes the term
"information, 28 for works protected by intellectual property
law, brevity is not his only motivation. By using the term "information," the author contributes to the false premise that
works protected as intellectual property are not scarce. While
information, the life-blood of innovation, is admittedly plentiful, the intellectual property laws are not fundamentally directed towards maximizing the quantity of information;
rather, their purpose is to encourage the creation of works of
expression and inventive works (often based on ideas, facts,
and information in the public domain) that would indeed be
scarce in the absence of such laws.2 9 By failing to distinguish
between works of innovation and mere information, the author inflates his claims about the extent to which the IP laws
restrict the public's access to information and their incompatibility with markets.
Further, in order to ensure that a rich public domain of
ideas and information exists from which authors and inventors may draw, IP law strives to exclude such subject matter
from its reach. To give just a few examples, copyright law
protects an author's work of expression, but none of the
work's ideas, facts, or concepts; 30 patent law restricts eligible
patentable subject matter and excludes from its protection
laws of nature, scientific principles, and abstract ideas; and
trademark law provides no protection for generic terms and
only conditional protection to marks that are in some way descriptive of the goods or services with which they are used.3'
27. Id. at 177.
28. See id. at 176.
29. See, e.g., 1 JAY DRATLER,

JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 1.08 (2003).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004).

LAW:

31. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakraberty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); 15 U.S.C.
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V. THE TRUE SOURCE OF ABUNDANCE: THE UNUSUALLY Low
COST OF POST-INVENTIVE REPRODUCTION

Works protected as intellectual property, particularly
those that are socially or economically productive, are indeed
rare. The privatization of the rights to such works and their
exchange in a market is therefore socially and economically
efficient, given the market's commonly accepted value of efficiently allocating scarce resources, a characterization Perelman accepts." Rare and valuable intangible inventions and
works of expression, to which the IP laws attach private
property rights, will be most efficiently allocated through a
market-based system. Throughout Steal This Idea, Perelman
overlooks this aspect of rarity among IP works and, as a result, overstates his claim that IP and markets are at odds.
Admittedly, however, after the inventor or author has invested the time and effort to create a work and obtain intellectual property rights, the scarcity of the work is capable of
being lost because the cost of its reproduction is unusually
low. Intellectual property's vulnerability to free-riders partially explains why the market "fails" to produce a socially desirable level of innovative works in the absence of intellectual
property protection.
In short, one must recognize a critical distinction: there
is, on the one hand, the abundance of information, which
places information outside the domain of the market; and, on
the other, the potential abundance of IP works, once produced, due to their low marginal cost of reproduction. The
fact that innovative works, once created, are capable of being
produced cheaply is not evidence of the general incompatibility of markets with IP; rather, it is the very cause of the mar§ 1064(3) and § 1052(e), (f) (2004).
32. See supra text accompanying note 22.
33. Although Perelman describes the "market failure" justification for the
intellectual property laws, see PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 13, it is unclear if he
truly understands it in practice. Discussing the efficiency of markets and their
compatibility with intellectual property, Perelman remarks, "[o]f course ... if
markets really worked as well as the dogmatic advocates of laissez faire would
have us think, we would have no need for intellectual property rights at all." Id.
at 188. Perelman overlooks that markets function differently depending on the
larger legal framework in which they exist. In the absence of IP laws, markets
for intellectual creations would fail to emerge as forcefully as they would in an
IP-friendly market because authors and inventors would produce fewer works
than they would in markets where rights to such works were privatized and intellectual property laws were enforced.
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ket failure that the IP laws are designed to correct and that
give us reason to be particularly vigilant in protecting IP
rights in light of the ease with which free-riders may appropriate them. While Perelman's proposed "public goods" (universal access) solution is a desirable model of rights in a
world of abundant information, its application to works of intellectual property-which are inherently scarce-would destroy the balance between access and incentives upon which
the intellectual property system is based.
Of course, the ideal system would be one that produces
both high levels of innovation and universal access. However,
the "public goods" model that Perelman proposes-which elevates universal access to the paramount and near-exclusive
goal-would undermine the inventor's ex ante (pre-inventive)
incentives to innovate, paradoxically creating less public access in the end. After all, the public can access only those
works that have been created; a public goods model stunts the
incentive to create, as the inventor no longer sees the potential pot of gold at the end of the rainbow that the IP laws offer.
Perelman thus overlooks the counterintuitive nature of
the IP laws to the extent that they restrict public access to
innovative works as a means of maximizing the amount of innovation that a society produces, ultimately maximizing total
social access. The intellectual property laws recognize innovation as a zero-sum game-if you err on the side of excessively favoring access, you correspondingly diminish the rewards future authors can expect to reap from their works,
which reduces innovation. Conversely, if the desire to create
incentives results in IP rights that are too strong, access to
innovation by the public and future authors and inventors
will be proportionately limited. Perelman's insensitivity to
the IP laws' design to delicately balance incentives to innovate and public access is evidenced by his unqualified conclusion that "[t]he more the law restricts people's access to information, the less information will be available."'
VI. THE HIGH FIXED COSTS OF PUBLIC GOODS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The privatization of "public goods" poses this basic prob34. Id. at 178.
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lem: How do we justify charging for something that costs virtually nothing to reproduce? In the case of intellectual property, the answer is clear: while the post-inventive cost of reproduction may be very low, the pre-inventive "fixed costs"
and risks of failure are unusually high. The "fixed costs" are
illustrated by the years it takes a writer to complete a novel,
a movie studio to produce a film, or a pharmaceutical company to invent a new drug. The risk of commercial failure is
demonstrated by how few novels, movies and new drugs are
commercially successful. Therefore, despite the inventor's
low costs of reproduction, the justification for charging users
to access the invention is clearly grounded in the inventor's
need to recover the substantial pre-inventive costs.
Perelman's misguided critique of the privatization of innovation examines only the latter half of the innovation process involving the unusually low marginal costs of reproducing
certain IP works, ignoring the unusually high pre-inventive
fixed costs that must be recovered by an innovator to justify
his efforts (and encourage future investment).
The consequences of following Perelman's logic would be
disastrous to the entire incentive structure underlying the IP
laws. Areas of innovation that involved end-products with
low marginal costs of reproduction would be decimated because prospective inventors and investors in those areas
would be deterred by the economic disasters of their predecessors.
By focusing on the post-inventive marginal costs of production, Perelman overlooks the IP laws' purpose of safeguarding the unusually high investment cost and risk that
authors and inventors bear when engaged in the process of
innovation-a burden increased by the ease with which the
works may be appropriated once created. On a broader level,
Perelman's analysis further weakens his general conclusion
that the intellectual property laws are incompatible with free
markets.

VII. PERELMAN'S FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE UNIQUE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Inconsistent with his predominant conception of intellectual property's "lack of scarcity," Perelman acknowledges at
various points throughout Steal This Idea that the process of
creating innovative products requires substantial investment
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and cost.35 The author admits that "the initial production of
public goods consumes resources." 6 For that reason, he acknowledges that markets for intellectual creations will fail
"without some sort of special protection." 37 To Perelman,
however, that "special protection" consists of only two alternatives: "making information a public good or a private monopoly." 8 Perelman defends the former, while insisting that
most economists and all defenders of intellectual property
"prefer the latter."39
Putting aside the "public goods" alternative for the moment, Perelman's critique of privatizing innovation (and of
the current regime of intellectual property laws) rests on
flawed assumptions about the economics of intellectual property and the potential competitiveness of IP markets.
First, Perelman argues that because the marginal cost of
producing another copy of an intellectual property work is
near zero, it is socially and economically inefficient not to
provide additional copies to purchasers willing to purchase
the work at its marginal cost-the traditional benchmark of
competitive pricing under antitrust law.4" Such marginal cost
pricing would undermine the economic structure-and incentive base-upon which IP laws are based. Second, Perelman
repeatedly asserts that intellectual property rights give their
owners, at the very least, market power, if not an economic
monopoly. As a result, he argues that high technology and
other IP-dominated markets are incapable of being even marginally competitive.4 1
Much of Perelman's critique of the IP laws rests on these
flawed assumptions. Accordingly, the validity and persuasiveness of the author's arguments and proposed alternative
are severely weakened.
A. MarginalCost PricingofIntellectualPropertyGoods
In support of his theory that the intellectual property

35. Id.at 166.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 180; see also id. at 39.
38. Id. at 182.
39. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 182.
40. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1976).
41. See PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 188-89.
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laws have increased the concentration of wealth in the U.S.,
Perelman asserts: "[I]ntellectual property is probably the
most important vehicle for increasing the gap between sales42
price and the cost of production in the present economy."
This observation reflects the author's lack of understanding of
the peculiar economics of intellectual property rights and of
the need to modify traditional tests of market power, monopoly power, and the assessment of competitive markets when
such rights are concerned.43
The relationship between price and cost is a common barometer of a firm's market power and the competitive landscape of a market in general." Most commonly, this test focuses on the extent to which the price of a firm's good
deviates from its marginal cost. 45 However, for the same reasons that intellectual property creations are considered "public goods," marginal cost pricing has been recognized as an
economically flawed approach both to evaluate the degree of
competition in markets dominated by IP and to assess a particular firm's market power in a relevant market. 4
Consider this issue from the standpoint of a particular
firm marketing IP products. Marginal cost pricing is typically not going to generate profits and attract investors, as it
would in other industries.4 7 Such pricing fails to offset the
unusually high fixed or "sunk" costs that the firm has invested (and, as is common in IP-dominated industries, to offset the losses absorbed from failed investments in other products that never reached the market).4' The inadequacy of
marginal cost pricing as a means to assess market power is
worsened by the unusually low cost of producing an additional unit of the product. 49 As a result, an intellectual prop42.

Id. at 173.

43. See infra text accompanying notes 42-56.
44. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Powerin AntitrustCases,94 HARv. L. REV. 937, 939-43 (1981).

45. Id.
46. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY § 4. 1c (2002); see also Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public
Subsidies for Open Source?Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 473, 477-78 (2003).

47. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Willard Tom, Is Innovation ing at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 45-46 (2001).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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erty owner must typically charge well above marginal cost to
be sufficiently profitable to sustain investment in the company and recover its fixed costs.5" What may be considered a
highly profitable, "super-competitive" price/cost ratio in a traditional industry may be just enough for a firm in an IP industry to survive. For this reason, examining the relationship between price and cost and the use of marginal cost
pricing are generally disfavored tools for assessing market
power in such industries.5 ' Instead, courts examine the extent to which alternative technologies exist and the number of
firms that offer such technology, both of which constrain the
ability of a firm to price its product above the level needed to
recover its fixed and marginal costs. These constraints are
the hallmarks of a competitive market.5 2
Looking more broadly at IP-dominated industries (i.e.,
pharmaceuticals, computer software, biotechnology, and entertainment), a vigorously competitive market may exist despite each firm's pricing well above marginal cost.53 This simply reflects the collective behavior of numerous firms in the
same position as the individual firm described above: each
firm is seeking to recover its unusually high investment costs
by pricing above marginal cost. Logically, therefore, marginal
cost pricing is not considered an accurate measure of the
market's competitiveness. Rather, product substitutability,
the extent to which alternative technologies exist, and other
market conditions are examined to make that determination.54
Perelman overlooks the unique economics of intellectual
property goods, instead concluding that charging well-above
marginal cost for such goods must necessarily be economically
inefficient.5 5 Perelman declares, without explanation, that
the common pricing of IP products above marginal cost "distort[s] the economy" and represents a "market failure."56
In fact, antitrust enforcement agencies (among others)
recognize the efficiency and indeed the necessity of permitting

50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., HOvENKAMP ET AL., supra note 45, § 4.1c.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 166-67.
56. Id. at 167.
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above-marginal cost pricing for products protected as intellectual property. This reflects a nuanced understanding of both
the unique way in which IP is produced, as well as the signals
that the IP laws are designed to send to current and future
authors and inventors to encourage them to innovate.57 Investment in IP works is often uniquely risky, timeconsuming, and expensive. Only by modifying the relevant
price/cost framework to account for these differences will the
competitiveness and concentration of IP-dominated industries
be accurately measured. Thus, the antitrust authorities do
not approach IP markets as an "exception" under antitrust
law; rather-while never compromising the fundamental
goals of antitrust of ensuring open, competitive markets that
benefit consumers-the authorities revise the economic lens
through which IP markets are scrutinized
58 in order to account
for their differences from other markets.
B. IntellectualPropertyandMonopoly Power
Contrary to the modern view of intellectual property
rights expressed by antitrust regulators and commentators,
Perelman repeatedly equates such rights with economic monopolies that confer market power on their owners.59 Similarly, Perelman believes that IP rights are fundamentally inconsistent with competitive markets." As noted, this false
assumption undermines the credibility of his broader argument and analysis.
Nearly ten years ago, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission issued the "Antitrust Guidelines
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property."6 One of its three
guiding principles is that the agencies would not presume
that an owner of an intellectual property asset necessarily
has any market power.62 This principle was based on the
widely accepted view that IP products (and the IP rights to
specific components of certain products) most often have
57. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 45, § 4.1c.; see also Gilbert &
Tom, supra note 46, at 45-46.
58. See, e.g., HOVENKAMPETAL., supra note 45, § 4.1c.
59. SeePERELMAN, supra note 7, at 29, 189, 191.
60. Id. at 188.
61. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm.
62. Id. § 2.2.
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commercial substitutes that constrain the ability of the intellectual property owner to price above competitive levels. 3
Perelman recounts the well-known economic and social
inefficiencies caused by monopoly power, linking those ills to
the rise of intellectual property and its alleged immunity from
antitrust scrutiny.' However, given the consensus among antitrust authorities that intellectual property grants do not
typically create market power, let alone monopoly power,
Perelman's critique of the IP system is again exposed as overdrawn.
Perelman's reference to intellectual property rights as
"monopolies" is understandable for several reasons. If the
term "monopoly" is interpreted loosely, an IP right is a type of
"monopoly" right insofar as it confers exclusive rights to its
owner to a particular work or product.
Further, IP rights
are admittedly capable of conferring market or even monopoly
power to its owners. The Microsoft antitrust case is one wellknown example,' but the monopoly power Microsoft acquired
and maintained in part due to the strength of its IP rights is
not at all representative of the typical market power created
by an intellectual property grant.
By re-examining the economics of intellectual property,
further flaws may be found in Perelman's criticism of what he
characterizes as lax antitrust enforcement of high technology
industries and other IP-dominated markets. The author
writes, "[u]nfortunately, rather than maintaining even a pretense of a meaningful antitrust policy, government agencies
are now tripping over themselves to strengthen intellectual
property rights."67 Perelman advances the theory that the
government, and in particular the antitrust enforcement
agencies, have largely been captured by the highly profitable
and powerful IP industries, whose growth has been

63. Id.; see also HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 45, § 4.1a (concluding, based
on similar reasoning, that "market power sufficient for any antitrust violation,
including tying, should never be inferred from intellectual property ownership
alone").
64. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 198.

65. However, the author does not use the term colloquially, but rather to
refer to an economic monopoly; as noted, this usage is inaccurate. See supra
text accompanying notes 59-63.
66. United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (final consent decree).
67. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 173.
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"[flostered by the absence of any meaningful antitrust actions. 68
Perelman's assumption that intellectual property grants
typically create market or monopoly power, coupled with his
misunderstanding of the economics of intellectual property
pricing and competitive markets, leads him to mistakenly
characterize the antitrust treatment of high technology and
IP-dominated industries as lax and ineffectual. In fact, however, antitrust agencies have kept a watchful eye on these industries, challenging them when appropriate. 9 Antitrust
regulation and enforcement has also faced the challenging
task of modifying traditional antitrust principles to accommodate the unique characteristics of the New Economy.
While traditionally antitrust law has pursued the twin goals
of low prices and high output, modern regulators recognize
that consumer welfare may be better off in some cases if
higher levels of innovation can be achieved by tolerating short
term price hikes and lower output. Antitrust law has prudently incorporated the value of innovation and technological
progress (and the indispensable role IP law plays in promoting them) into its calculus of "economic efficiency" and consumer welfare.7"
VIII. PERELMAN'S PROPOSAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A
"PUBLIC GOOD"

Based on the ideal of community ownership of society's
creative output, Perelman's proposed alternative to the current system of intellectual property is appealing on its face:
the public would have a fundamental right to all intellectual
creations. Not surprisingly, however, the details of this alternative regime are ill-defined. Perelman would make innovation-and its products-a true public good, like national defense or the U.S. mail; that is, innovation would be publicly
funded through taxes and accessed or "owned" by all.71 Under

68. Id.
69. See generally Gilbert & Tom, supra note 46 (detailing numerous antitrust actions against IP-centered corporations during the 1990s).
70. See Carrier, supra note 17, at 810-15; see also Gilbert & Tom, supra
note 46, at 44 (finding that innovation's "role has become increasingly important
and has been decisive in several merger and non-merger enforcement actions
that have potentially very significant impacts for consumer welfare").
71. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 12.
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such a system, society (presumably through a representative
government body), rather than the market, "will still have to
decide how much of its resources will be devoted to opening
new theaters, making new films, or adding new long-distance
capacity."7 2 Perelman continues: "The public will somehow
have to develop new institutions appropriate for making such
decisions. Perhaps most of all, society will have to raise the
level of education so that the public will be prepared to make
such decisions in an intelligent manner."' 3
Perelman is touching on one of the most fundamental
questions in the fields of political science, economics and the
law: How are a society's resources most efficiently allocated?
Some, like Perelman, would argue they are most efficiently
allocated through the well-intentioned directives of a centralized government body, while others would defend a "laissezfair" economic environment in which larger trends are merely
the cumulative result of a series of individual transactions
that take place in open and competitive markets. There are
well-reasoned arguments of the type Perelman presents in
Steal This Idea that have merit, but Perelman's particular
"public goods" model is a flawed approach to encouraging innovation for two basic reasons.
First, Perelman argues that our only choices to protect
and encourage innovation consist of two mutually exclusive
approaches: treating innovation as a private monopoly or as a
public good.74 This is a gross oversimplification, which also
ignores the fact that the intellectual property laws, for as long
as they have existed, have struggled to find an optimum balance between the competing interests of access (Perelman's
"public good") and incentives (Perelman's "private monopoly").75 Further, underlying that struggle is the assumption
72. Id. at 166.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 82.
75. Intellectual property law is replete with examples of how to balance the
rights of the inventor/owner with the interests of the public: Copyright law protects only works of expression, excluding facts and ideas, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2004); the fair use doctrine, often referred to as a "safety valve," protects
against cases in which the routine application of copyright law would unduly
restrict public access to the work, see id. § 107; and the Copyright Act contains
compulsory licensing provisions, see id. §§ 107-118. Trademark law provides no
protection for generic marks or, with some qualification, descriptive marks. See
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2004) (stating that registered marks that become generic
terms are subject to cancellation at any time); id. § 1052(e), (f) (stating that de-

1304

SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW

Vol: 44

that the alternative that Perelman proposes-which elevates
universal access as the paramount and nearly exclusive concern-would significantly undermine the incentives to innovate, paradoxically creating less access in the end."6
Secondly, even apart from an approach that seeks to optimally balance access and incentives, Perelman fails to consider yet another alternative, best articulated by Professor
Lawrence Lessig.7 7 Lessig argues that in some contexts innovation may best flourish in an environment unencumbered by
both public and private interests.7 ' For example, the Internet
has proven, particularly in its infancy, to be an extremely fertile medium through which innovation has flourished. Lessig
argues that innovation has the best chance of continuing at
this rate if the Internet's basic architecture remains as neutral as possible in terms of its accessibility and compatibility
with the varied universe of applications and contentproviders that depend in some form on the Internet."9 This
presumably requires some level of public oversight, but
merely to ensure that no group-public or private-configures
the Internet to favor any particular applications or contentprovider, group, or interest.
Lessig's proposal reminds us not to paint innovation policy with too broad a brush. "Innovation" captures an incredibly broad and diverse array of industries and products. At
the very least, therefore, when considering the best policy for
a particular area of innovation, it seems best to consider a
range of alternatives with varying degrees of private and public sector involvement, in addition to the neutral, hands-off
approach articulated by Lessig in the context of Internetrelated innovation.
By contrast, Perelman's "public goods" approach is not
merely inflexible and vague, but riddled with other potential

scriptive marks may only be registered provided they have acquired secondary
meaning). Patent law provides no protection for fundamental principles or for
laws of nature. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
Patent law includes an experimental use exception, see 35 U.S.C. § 272(e)(1);
requires the disclosure of invention, see id. § 12; and includes the requirements
of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, which means that the invention must
represent a significant advance over preexisting inventions, see id § 101.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
77.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS (2001).

78. See id. at 40.
79. See id.
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problems, including the risk of government censorship and
the difficulty of anticipating consumer demand for innovative
products and works of expression in the absence of a competitive market that provides some measure of supply and demand.
Despite these flaws, the author does highlight significant
shortcomings of the current intellectual property system, including the arguably unethical practice of converting natural
resources from developing countries into patentable medi80
cines and other products without adequate compensation;
the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office's minimal scrutiny of
patents and the resulting overbreadth of many intellectual
property grants;"' and, in contrast to real property, the difficulty of defining an idea or invention (or, in the case of most
patents, the component of an invention) with any meaningful
precision."'
Perelman also provides an interesting theory about the
origin of the modern expansion of intellectual property rights
in the U.S., claiming that the deteriorating economic conditions and trade deficit of the 1960s led major U.S. corporations to successfully pressure the government to strengthen
the IP laws.8" This, he argues, led not only to an intellectual
property trade surplus of twenty-five billion dollars,' but in
fact to a fundamental change in the nature of the domestic
economy, as capital and production was outsourced to other
countries and intellectual property became one of the most
lucrative domestic exports, a politically controversial trend
that continues today.8 5
IX. CONCLUSION
The views presented in Steal This Idea illustrate how

80. PERELMAN, supra note 7, at 46-47.
81. Id at 60-62.
82. Id.at 82. In regard to the last point: By extension, a system of awarding
legal rights to such ill-defined concepts may be reasonably challenged on fairness and efficiency grounds. See id.
83. Id.at 31-32.
84. Id.at 36.
85. See, e.g., Saritha Rai, An Outsourcing Giant Fights Back: Reluctant
Spokesman for a Re iled Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § 3, at 1 (profiling Azim Premji, chairman of Wipro, a major Indian technology outsourcing
company that the U.S. and other countries "increasingly denounce as a major
cause ofjob losses").
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easy it is to forget what gave rise to the intellectual property
laws initially and what would be lost in their absence. On the
surface, Perelman's theory is intuitively appealing. If society
produces a reservoir of information and innovation, why do
we enact and continue to defend a set of laws that have the
effect of restricting the public's access to it? The simple answer is that we are examining a society's creative output that
is a productof the existing intellectual property laws. By failing to credit the current IP laws with any role in society's innovative output, Perelman and other critics can more easily
overlook the potential problems with eliminating or substantially reducing the laws' reach. In addition, there is an inherent complexity to a system that confers private property
rights to owners of intangible property, which Steal This
Idea, like many critiques of IP law situated within the contemporary debates over the "fairness" of IP law generally,
fails to appreciate. Unlike other areas of the law where one's
moral instinct coincides with the law's directives, intellectual
property law is counterintuitive because it balances two
equally appealing yet inherently conflicting interests, one of
which is often overlooked: (a) maximizing the total amount of
social innovation in society generally and (b) providing the
optimum degree of public access to it. The ingenuity of IP law
is its recognition that only by balancing these two goals,
rather than blindly pursuing one without regard to the consequences to the other, will the optimum amount of both total
innovation and social access be achieved. No one disagrees
with the idealistic notion that society desires to grant the
public as much access to the fruits of innovation as possible.
However, the IP laws recognize that granting indiscriminate
public access to intellectual property will undermine innovators' incentives to write, produce, or invent, thus reducing absolute levels of innovation. Conversely, giving innovators excessive rewards and control over their creations will
unnecessarily restrict public access.
Perelman's analysis is further weakened by his mistaken
characterization of the ability of IP rights to create market
power and of the relationship between antitrust and IP law
generally. As even Perelman acknowledges, markets have
proven to be the most efficient means of allocating scarce resources. However, Perelman argues that IP rights are inherently monopolistic and at odds with open, competitive mar-
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kets, contrary to the views of modern antitrust regulators and
many courts, who have recognized that vigorous, open, and
competitive markets are entirely consistent with strong intellectual property rights and that a complementary relationship exists between the two fields of law. Indeed, by protecting rights in intangible property, the law stimulates
competition to secure the benefits of the rights conferred.
This is not to deny that high technology and IP-dominated
markets have unique characteristics that have forced antitrust experts to update traditional antitrust analysis.
The intellectual property laws have much room for improvement. However, meaningful reform can only be based
on a more nuanced understanding than that provided by
Perelman in Steal This Idea of the economic significance of
intellectual property rights, the unique characteristics and
underlying economics of IP-dominated markets, and the modern relationship between competition policy and intellectual
property law.

